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The Once and Future
Superpower
Why China Won’t Overtake the United States
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth

A

fter two and a half decades, is the United States’ run as the
world’s sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes,
seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the
United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China’s
economy is on track to become the world’s biggest, and even if its
growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many
years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract
friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert
sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question
is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon.
But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer
translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which
means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and
established ones to fall. And China—the only country with the raw
potential to become a true global peer of the United States—also faces
a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how
far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States’
economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country’s military
superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance
structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international
order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather
than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone
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should start getting used to a world in
which the United States remains the
sole superpower for
decades to come.
Lasting preeminence will
help the United States ward off the
greatest traditional international danger,
war between the world’s major powers. And it
will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges
such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of
leadership and force choices among competing priorities,
particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power
comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading
role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that
U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked.
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the
country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted
environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle
class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel
on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological
expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising
powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the
leading power. China may export container after container of hightech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal
much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call
“processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for
assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these
Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations
from more developed countries.
When looking at measures of technological prowess that better
reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position
becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual
property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away
the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in
receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in
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second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a
massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for
the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the
technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those
registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly
14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with
just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential
articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of
citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the
same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these
articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown
of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine.
Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based
researchers have received two.
Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, gdp, greatly
underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For
one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its
environment counts favorably toward its gdp, even though it will reduce
economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising
cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing,
gdp was originally designed to measure midtwentieth-century manufacturing economies,
and so the more knowledge-based and global
ized a country’s production is, the more its
gdp underestimates its economy’s
true size.
A new statistic developed by
the un suggests the degree to
which gdp inflates China’s relative power. Called “inclusive
wealth,” this measure represents
economists’ most systematic effort
to date to calculate a state’s wealth.
As a un report explained, it counts a
country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i)
manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines,
and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education,
health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources,
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ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive
wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion.
The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may
lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by gdp and inclusive
wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same
level of scrutiny as gdp. The problem with gdp, however, is that it
measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced
in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist
put it, “Gauging an economy by its gdp is like judging a company by
its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because
inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can
conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more
useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition.
But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese
economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of
converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states
had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example,
the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms
of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies
during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War.
This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could
soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power.
China’s relative technological backwardness today, however, means
that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy
for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as
opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood.
BARRIERS TO ENTRY

The technological and economic differences between China and the
United States wouldn’t matter much if all it took to gain superpower
status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United
States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for
that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry
Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over
the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure
for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories
of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack
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submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an
overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of
advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China
to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them.
For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific
and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs,
increasing its R & D spending and its
numbers of graduates with degrees in
A giant economy alone
science and engineering. But there are
limits to how fast any country can leap won’t make China the
forward in such matters, and there are world’s second superpower.
various obstacles in China’s way—such
as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient
methods of allocating capital—that will be extremely hard to change
given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing
a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military
R & D, more than 13 times as much as China’s estimated amount, so
even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap.
Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring
advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex
over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but
by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the
figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design and
build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can
take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the
scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons
that give the United States command of the commons, there would
be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese
defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge.
Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a
wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the
evils of the military-industrial complex and the “waste, fraud, and
abuse” in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors,
and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many
decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind
of “learning by doing” experience resides in organizations, not in
individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and
instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an
effective shortcut for acquiring it.
May/June 2016
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China’s defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar
Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, “Aside from a
few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese militaryindustrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for
designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems.” For example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance
aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the
effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other
areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea
warfare. China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is
doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of
producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in
quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s.
Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds
of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation
of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels
of silencing.
Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to
actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just
because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an
incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together
in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex
surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for
example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel
to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to
rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected from them.
Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the
commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task
places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, China’s centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it.
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT

In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and
morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed
from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of
conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and
revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw
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the United States’ own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few
seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but
many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly
countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies.
But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major
milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the
requisite economic resources. But a giant
economy alone won’t make China the
This is not your grandfather’s
world’s second superpower, nor would
overcoming the next big hurdle, attain- power transition.
ing the requisite technological capacity.
After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into
the full range of systems needed for global power projection and
learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and
fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue
to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might
call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic
growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has
a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological
capacity to become a superpower.
China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something
else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United
States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential
imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the
burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing
the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate
Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the
Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest
military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the
Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its
military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than
the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers
find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear
that motivated Washington during the Cold War.
Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has
few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it
May/June 2016
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has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the
world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered
the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S.
defense spending stood at around three percent of gdp at the end of
the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close
to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases
its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s
only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than
it is worth.
Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status,
as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future
of the international system hinges most on whether the United
States continues to bear the much
lower burden of sustaining what we
A world of lasting U.S.
and others have called “deep engagemilitary preeminence and
ment,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years.
declining U.S. economic
And barring some odd change of heart
dominance will test the
that results in a true abnegation of its
United States’ capacity
global role (as opposed to overwrought,
for restraint.
politicized charges sometimes made
about its already having done so),
Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core
military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key
regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems.
The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially
in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years.
Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the
difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is
as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing
favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than
most Americans appreciate.
For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having
enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable
than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins.
A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been
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to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success
in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes
common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security
dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers,
rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent
into competitive economic or military blocs.
Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these
challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom
even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the
task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the
United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at
the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United
States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges,
it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of
analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now
calling for.
LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION

Ever since the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States’ dramatic
power advantage over other states has been accompanied by the risk
of self-inflicted wounds, as occurred in Iraq. But the slippage in the
United States’ economic position may have the beneficial effect of
forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on the core mission of the country’s grand strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral
conflicts. Indeed, that has been the guiding logic behind President
Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, a world of lasting U.S.
military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance will
continue to test the United States’ capacity for restraint, in four
main ways.
First is the temptation to bully or exploit American allies in the
pursuit of self-interested gain. U.S. allies are dependent on Washington
in many ways, and leaning on them to provide favors in return—
whether approving of controversial U.S. policies, refraining from
activities the United States opposes, or agreeing to lopsided terms in
mutually beneficial deals—seems like something only a chump would
forgo. (Think of the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s
frequent claims that the United States always loses in its dealings
with foreigners, including crucial allies, and that he would restore the
May/June 2016
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country’s ability to win.) But the basic contract at the heart of the
contemporary international order is that if its members put aside the
quest for relative military advantage, join a dense web of institutional
networks, and agree to play by common rules, then the United States
will not take advantage of its dominance to extract undue returns
from its allies. It would be asking too much to expect Washington
to never use its leverage to seek better deals, and a wide range of
presidents—including John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George
W. Bush, and Obama—have done so at various times. But if
Washington too often uses its power to achieve narrowly selfinterested gains, rather than to protect and advance the system as
a whole, it will run a real risk of eroding the legitimacy of both its
leadership and the existing order.
Second, the United States will be increasingly tempted to overreact
when other states—namely, China—use their growing economic
clout on the world stage. Most of the recent rising powers of note,
including Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were stronger
militarily than economically. China, by contrast, will for decades
be stronger economically than militarily. This is a good thing, since
military challenges to global order can turn ugly quickly. But it
means that China will mount economic challenges instead, and
these will need to be handled wisely. Most of China’s efforts along
these lines will likely involve only minor or cosmetic alterations to
the existing order, important for burnishing Beijing’s prestige but
not threatening to the order’s basic arrangements or principles.
Washington should respond to these gracefully and with forbearance, recognizing that paying a modest price for including Beijing
within the order is preferable to risking provoking a more fundamental
challenge to the structure in general.
The recent fracas over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is
a good example of how not to behave. China proposed the aiib in
2013 as a means to bolster its status and provide investment in infrastructure in Asia. Although its criteria for loans might turn out to be
less constructive than desired, it is not likely to do major harm to the
region or undermine the structure of the global economy. And yet the
United States responded by launching a public diplomatic campaign
to dissuade its allies from joining. They balked at U.S. opposition and
signed up eagerly. By its reflexive opposition both to a relatively
constructive Chinese initiative and to its allies’ participation in it,
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Washington created an unnecessary zero-sum battle that ended in a
humiliating diplomatic defeat. (A failure by the U.S. Congress to pass
the Trans-Pacific Partnership as negotiated, meanwhile, would be an
even greater fiasco, leading to serious questions abroad about U.S.
global leadership.)
Third, the United States will still face the temptation that always
accompanies power, to intervene in places where its core national
interests are not in play (or to expand the definition of its core national
interests so much as to hollow out the concept). That temptation can
exist in the midst of a superpower struggle—the United States got
bogged down in Vietnam during the Cold War, as did the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan—and it clearly exists today, at a time when the
United States has no peer rivals. Obama has carefully guarded against
this temptation. He attracted much criticism for elevating “Don’t do
stupid stuff ” to a grand-strategic maxim. But if doing stupid stuff
threatens the United States’ ability to sustain its grand strategy and
associated global presence, then he had a point. Missing, though, was
a corollary: “Keep your eye on the ball.” And for nearly seven decades,
that has meant continuing Washington’s core mission of fostering
stability in key regions and keeping the global economy and wider
order humming.
Finally, Washington will need to avoid adopting overly aggressive
military postures even when core interests are at stake, such as with
China’s increasingly assertive stance in its periphery. It is true that
Beijing’s “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities have greatly raised the
costs and risks of operating U.S. aircraft and surface ships (but
not submarines) near China. How Washington should respond to
Beijing’s newfound local military capability, however, depends on
what Washington’s strategic goals are. To regain all the military freedom of action the United States enjoyed during its extraordinary
dominance throughout the 1990s would indeed be difficult, and the
actions necessary would increase the risk of future confrontations. Yet
if Washington’s goals are more limited—securing regional allies and
sustaining a favorable institutional and economic order—then the
challenge should be manageable.
By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the United
States could still deter Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies
despite China’s rising military power. Unlike the much-discussed
Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict, this approach would not
May/June 2016
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envision hostilities rapidly escalating to strikes on the Chinese mainland. Rather, it would be designed to curtail China’s ability during
a conflict to operate within what is
known as “the first island
By adopting its own area- commonly
chain,” encompassing parts of Japan,
denial strategy, the United the Philippines, and Taiwan. Under
this strategy, the United States and
States could still deter
its allies would employ the same mix
Chinese aggression and
of capabilities—such as mines and
protect U.S. allies.
mobile antiship missiles—that China
itself has used to push U.S. surface
ships and aircraft away from its coast. And it could turn the tables
and force China to compete in areas where it remains very weak,
most notably, undersea warfare.
The premise of such a strategy is that even if China were able to
deny U.S. surface forces and aircraft access to the area near its coast,
it would not be able to use that space as a launching pad for projecting military power farther during a conflict. China’s coastal waters,
in this scenario, would turn into a sort of no man’s sea, in which neither state could make much use of surface ships or aircraft. This
would be a far cry from the situation that prevailed during the 1990s,
when China could not stop the world’s leading military power from
enjoying unfettered access to its airspace and ocean right up to its
territorial border. But the change needs to be put in perspective: it
is only natural that after spending tens of billions of dollars over
decades, China has begun to reverse this unusual vulnerability, one
the United States would never accept for itself.
While this area-denial strategy would help solve a long-term problem, it would do little to address the most immediate challenge from
China: the military facilities it is steadily building on artificial islands
in the South China Sea. There is no easy answer, but Washington
should avoid too aggressive a reaction, which could spark a conflict.
After all, these small, exposed islands arguably leave the overall
military balance unchanged, since they would be all but impossible
to defend in a conflict. China’s assertiveness may even be backfiring.
Last year, the Philippines—real islands with extremely valuable
basing facilities—welcomed U.S. forces back onto its shores after a
24-year absence. And the United States is now in talks to base longrange bombers in Australia.
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To date, the Obama administration has chosen to conduct so-called
freedom-of-navigation operations in order to contest China’s maritime claims. But as the leader of the order it largely shaped, the
United States has many other arrows in its quiver. To place the burden
of escalation on China, the United States—or, even better, its allies—
could take a page from China’s playbook and ramp up quasi-official
research voyages in the area. Another asset Washington has is international law. Pressure is mounting on China to submit its territorial
disputes to arbitration in international courts, and if Beijing continues
to resist doing so, it will lose legitimacy and could find itself a target
of sanctions and other diplomatic punishments. And if Beijing tried
to extract economic gains from contested regions, Washington could
facilitate a process along the lines of the proportional punishment
strategy it helped make part of the World Trade Organization: let the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, determine the gains
of China’s illegal actions, place a temporary tariff on Chinese exports
to collect exactly that much revenue while the sovereignty claims are
being adjudicated, and then distribute them once the matter is settled
before the International Court of Justice. Whatever approach is adopted,
what matters for U.S. global interests is not the islands themselves
or the nature of the claims per se but what these provocations do to
the wider order.
Although China can “pose problems without catching up,” in the
words of the political scientist Thomas Christensen, the bottom line
is that the United States’ global position gives it room to maneuver.
The key is to exploit the advantages of standing on the defensive: as
a raft of strategic thinkers have pointed out, challenging a settled status
quo is very hard to do.
KNOW THYSELF

Despite China’s ascent, the United States’ superpower position is
more secure than recent commentary would have one believe—so
secure, in fact, that the chief threat to the world’s preeminent power
arguably lies within. As U.S. dominance ebbs slightly from its peak
two decades ago, Washington may be tempted to overreact to the setbacks inherent in an admittedly frustrating and hard-to-manage world
by either lashing out or coming home—either way abandoning the
patient and constructive approach that has been the core of its grand
strategy for many decades. This would be a grave mistake. That
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grand strategy has been far more successful and beneficial than most
people realize, since they take for granted its chief accomplishment—
preventing the emergence of a much less congenial world.
One sure way to generate a wrong-headed push for retrenchment would be to undertake another misadventure like the war in
Iraq. That America has so far weathered that disaster with its global
position intact is a testament to just how robust its superpower
status is. But that does not mean that policymakers can make perpetual blunders with impunity. In a world in which the United
States retains its overwhelming military preeminence as its economic dominance slips, the temptation to overreact to perceived
threats will grow—even as the margin of error for absorbing the
costs of the resulting mistakes will shrink. Despite what is being
said on the campaign trail these days, the United States is hardly in
an unusually perilous global situation. But nor is its standing so
secure that irresponsible policies by the next president won’t take
their toll.∂
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